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Abstract. Information leakage is a significant problem in modern soft-
ware systems. Information leaks due to side channels are especially hard
to detect and analyze. In this paper, we present techniques for automated
synthesis of adaptive side-channel attacks that recover secret values. Our
attack synthesis techniques iteratively generate inputs which, when fed to
code that accesses the secret, reveal partial information about the secret
based on the side-channel observations, reducing the remaining uncer-
tainty about the secret in each attack step. Our approach is incremental,
reusing results from prior iterations in each attack step to improve the
efficiency of attack synthesis. We use symbolic execution to extract path
constraints, automata-based model counting to estimate probabilities of
execution paths, and meta-heuristics to maximize information gain based
on entropy in order to minimize the number of synthesized attack steps.
Keywords: Side-channel analysis · Symbolic execution · Model count-
ing · Attack synthesis · Quantitative information flow
1 Introduction
It is common for modern software systems store and manipulate sensitive data. It
is crucial for software developers to write code in a manner that prevents disclo-
sure of sensitive data that should be kept secret to unauthorized users. However,
computation that occurs over sensitive data can have measurable non-functional
characteristics that can reveal information. This can allow a malicious user to
infer information about sensitive data by measuring characteristics such as exe-
cution time, memory usage, or network delay. This type of unintended leakage of
information about sensitive data due to non-functional behavior of a program is
called a side-channel vulnerability. In this paper, we focus on automatically syn-
thesizing adaptive side-channel attacks against functions that manipulate secret
values. Our attack consists of a sequence of public inputs that a malicious user
can use to leak information about a secret by observing side-channel behavior.
By synthesizing an attack, we provide an exploit demonstrating the side-channel
vulnerability of the function.
Our approach uses symbolic execution to extract constraints that character-
ize the relationship between the secret values in the program, attacker controlled
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pub l i c Boolean checkPIN ( St r ing h , S t r ing l ){
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 4 ; i++)
i f (h . charAt ( i ) != l . charAt ( i ) )
re turn f a l s e ;
r e turn true ;
}
Fig. 1: PIN checking example.
inputs, and side-channel observations. We investigate and compare several meth-
ods for selecting the next attack input based on meta-heuristics for maximizing
the amount of information gained and automata-based techniques for constraint
solving and model counting. Our attack synthesis approach is adaptive, taking
into account the information learned about the secret in previous steps while
choosing the public input for the next attack step; and it is incremental, re-
using the results from prior iterations in order to improve the performance of
each attack synthesis step. Moreover, our attack synthesis approach can handle
unbounded string constraints in addition to linear arithmetic constraints.
Contribution. Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows: (1)
to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first that can automatically synthe-
size side-channel attacks for programs that manipulate both unbounded string
and numeric values; (2) we use a greedy approach that maximizes the information
gain about the secret in each attack step and we use meta-heuristics for searching
the input space during attack synthesis, resulting in a generalized attack synthe-
sis approach; (3) we present an incremental attack synthesis approach based on
incremental automata-based model counting that reuses the results from prior
attack steps in order to improve the efficiency of attack synthesis; and (4) we
present experiments on Java functions and case studies demonstrating realistic
attack scenarios, and our experiments demonstrate that our attack synthesis
approach is effective and our incremental approach drastically improves the per-
formance of attack synthesis, reducing the attack synthesis time by an order of
magnitude.
2 Motivation
Motivating Example 1. Consider a PIN-based authentication function (Fig. 1)
with inputs: 1) a secret PIN h, and 2) a user input, l. Both h and l are strings of
digit characters (“0”–“9”) of length 4. We have adopted the nomenclature used
in security literature where h denotes the high-security value (the secret PIN)
and l denotes the low-security input value, (the input that the function compares
with the PIN). The function compares the PIN and the user input character by
character and returns false as soon as it finds a mismatch. Otherwise it returns
true.
This function has a timing side-channel and one can infer information about
the secret h by measuring the execution time. In this implementation of checkPIN
each length of the common prefix of h and l, the number of bytecode instruc-
tions that will be executed will differ which may cause an observable difference
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in execution time. Notice that if h and l have no common prefix, then checkPIN
will have the shortest execution since the loop body will be executed only once;
this corresponds to execution of 63 Java bytecode instructions. If h and l have a
common prefix of one character, we see a longer execution since the loop body
executes twice (78 instructions). In the case that h and l match completely,
checkPIN has the longest execution (123 instructions).
If we assume that differences in the number of bytecode instructions are
observable by measuring the execution time, then there are 5 observable val-
ues since there are 5 execution paths with different lengths, proportional to the
length of the common prefix of h and l. In general, using the number of executed
bytecode instructions as a measurable observation can result in observations that
are indistinguishable in practice. Thus, we combine observations into indistin-
guishability intervals o± δ using an observability threshold δ. For this example
assume that differences among execution path lengths are above this threshold.
Given this side-channel, an attacker can choose an input and use the timing
observation to determine how much of a prefix of the input has matched the
secret. In order to automate this process, our approach starts with automatically
generating the path constraints and corresponding execution costs (in terms of
number of executed bytecode instructions) using symbolic execution (Table 1).
It merges path constraints based on the observability threshold, resulting in
a set of observability constraints. It then uses these constraints to synthesize
an attack which determines the value of the secret PIN. We make use of an
uncertainty function, based on Shannon entropy, to measure the progress of
an attack (Section 4.1). Intuitively, the attacker’s uncertainty, H starts off at
some positive value corresponding to the initial uncertainty of the sercret, and
decreases during the attack. When H = 0, the attacker has fully learned the
secret (Table 2).
Table 1: Observation constraints
generated by symbolic execution of
the function in Figure 1.
i Observation Constraint, ψi o
1 charat(l, 0) 6= charat(h, 0) 63
2 charat(l, 0) = charat(h, 0)∧ 78
charat(l, 1) 6= charat(h, 1)
3 charat(l, 0) = charat(h, 0)∧ 93
charat(l, 1) = charat(h, 1)∧
charat(l, 2) 6= charat(h, 2)
4 charat(l, 0) = charat(h, 0)∧ 108
charat(l, 1) = charat(h, 1)∧
charat(l, 2) = charat(h, 2)∧
charat(l, 3) 6= charat(h, 3)
5 charat(l, 0) = charat(h, 0)∧ 123
charat(l, 1) = charat(h, 1)∧
charat(l, 2) = charat(h, 2)∧
charat(l, 3) = charat(h, 3)
Table 2: Attack inputs (l), uncertainty
about the secret (H), and observations
(o). Prefix matches are shown in bold.
Step H l o Step H l o
1 13.13 “8299” 63 15 5.906 “1392” 93
2 12.96 “0002” 63 16 5.643 “1316” 93
3 9.813 “1058” 78 17 5.321 “1308” 93
4 9.643 “1477” 78 18 4.906 “1362” 93
5 9.451 “1583” 78 19 4.321 “1378” 93
6 9.228 “1164” 78 20 3.169 “1338” 108
7 8.965 “1950” 78 21 3.000 “1332” 108
8 8.643 “1220” 78 22 2.807 “1334” 108
9 8.228 “1786” 78 23 2.584 “1333” 108
10 7.643 “1817” 78 24 2.321 “1330” 108
11 6.643 “1664” 78 25 2.000 “1335” 108
12 6.491 “1342” 93 26 1.584 “1336” 108
13 6.321 “1328” 93 27 0.000 “1337” 123
14 6.129 “1386” 93
Suppose that the secret is “1337”. The initial uncertainty is log2 10
4 = 13.13
bits of information (assuming uniform distribution). Our attack synthesizer gen-
erates input “8229” at the first step and makes an observation with cost 63,
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which corresponds to ψ1. This indicates that charat(h, 0) 6= 8. Similarly, a sec-
ond synthesized input, “0002”, implies charat(h, 0) 6= 0 and the uncertainty is
again reduced. At the third step the synthesized input “1058” yields an observa-
tion of cost 78. Hence, ψ2 is the correct path constraint to update our constraints
on h, which becomes
charat(h, 0) 6= 8 ∧ charat(h, 0) 6= 0 ∧ charat(h, 0) = 1 ∧ charat(h, 1) 6= 0
We continue synthesizing inputs and updating the constraints on h, which tell
us more information about h, until the secret is known after 27 steps. At the final
step, we make an observation which corresponds to ψ5 indicating a full match
and the remaining uncertainty is 0. As in this example, the goal of our search for
attack inputs is to drive the entropy that characterizes the remaining uncertainty
about the secret to 0. Thus, we propose entropy optimization techniques. This
particular type of attack is called a segment attack which is known to be a serious
source of security flaws [5, 14, 18, 22, 27], and it is exponentially shorter than a
brute-force attack. Our approach automatically synthesizes a segment attack.
Motivating Example 2. Consider another example (Figure 2). If secret value h is
lexicographically smaller than user input l, the execution time of stringInequal-
ity corresponds to 47 instructions, and 62 otherwise. Symbolically executing the
stringInequality method (note that, we do not symbolically execute the com-
pareTo method from Java’s string library but capture it as a string constraint
directly), two path constraints are inferred with distinguishable observations
shown in Table 3. For simplicity, consider the secret domain to be from “AA” to
“ZZ” (262 = 676 strings), the secret value is “LL” and the first attack input is
“AA”. In Table 4 we show an attack that recovers the secret in 20 attack steps.
We can generate an attack like the one shown in Table 4 by finding a satisfying
solution (i.e., model) to the constraints on the low variable that is consistent with
the observations about the secret we have accumulated so far. We call this the
Model-based (M) approach (see §5), and this approach does generate optimal
segment attacks as we discussed above for the example shown in Fig. 1. However,
for the example shown in Figure 2 the Model-based approach cannot generate
an optimal attack.
The attack shown in Table 4 recovers the secret but it is not optimal in terms
of the length of the attack. In order to generate an optimal attack we have to
choose an input that maximizes the amount of information leaked in each attack
step. Then, we can generate the attack shown in Table 5 which is optimal and
requires only 9 steps. This corresponds to a binary search, finding the middle
point to divide the domain of secret value in a balanced way. For our example,
the domain size d is 262 and taking log2 d, we get d9.40e = 10 attack steps in
the worst case. In order to generate the optimal attack automatically, we need
to construct an objective function (see §4.1) characterizing the information gain
for each attack step and use optimization techniques (see §5) to maximize the
objective function.
Let us have a look at the constraints on secret value h at each attack step for
the optimal attack from Table 6. At each attack step we gain new information
about the secret value h and a new constraint is added to the already existing
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pub l i c s t a t i c void s t r i n g I n e qu a l i t y ( St r ing
h , S t r ing l ) {
i f (h . compareTo ( l ) <= 0) {
f o r ( i n t i = 1 ; i > 0 ; i−−) ;
} e l s e {
f o r ( i n t i = 5 ; i > 0 ; i−−) ;
}
}
Fig. 2: String inequality example.
constraint Ch. The constraint Ch grows and becomes more complex in each
attack step. Constraint solving and model counting are the most expensive parts
of our approach. So, if we can reuse prior solutions to constraint solving and
model counting to take advantage of the incremental nature of attack synthesis,
we can increase the efficiency of our approach. We call this approach incremental
attack synthesis (see §4) and demonstrate that it improves the efficiency of attack
synthesis significantly (see §6).
Table 3:
Observation
constraints of
the function in
Figure 2
i ψi o
1 h ≤ l 42
2 h > l 67
Table 4: Non-optimal attack
Step H l o Step H l o
1 9.40 “AC” 67 11 7.56 “PJ” 42
2 9.39 “AE” 67 12 6.82 “PI” 42
3 9.39 “JZ” 67 13 6.80 “NA” 42
4 8.70 “XE” 42 14 5.70 “LZ” 42
5 8.41 “XB” 42 15 4.64 “LI” 67
6 8.40 “KQ” 67 16 4.00 “LR” 42
7 8.33 “XA” 42 17 3.00 “LK” 67
8 8.32 “KU” 67 18 2.58 “LO” 42
9 8.30 “SI” 42 19 1.58 “LM” 42
10 7.60 “KZ” 67 20 0.00 “LL” 42
Table 5: Optimal attack
Step H l o
1 8.40 “MZ” 42
2 7.40 “GM” 67
3 6.40 “JS” 67
4 5.43 “LI” 67
5 4.39 “MD” 42
6 3.32 “LS” 67
7 2.32 “LN” 67
8 1.00 “LK” 67
9 0.00 “LL” 42
Table 6: Incremental nature of constraints at each step of adaptive attack.
Attack step Attack input Constraint on secret value, Ch
1 “MZ” h <= “MZ”
2 “GM” h <= “MZ” ∧ h > “GM”
3 “JS” h <= “MZ” ∧ h > “GM” ∧ h > “JS”
... ... ...
9 “LL”
h <= “MZ” ∧ h > “GM” ∧ h > “JS”∧
h > “LI” ∧ h <= “MD” ∧ h <= “LS”∧
h > “LN” ∧ h > “LK” ∧ h <= “LL”
3 Synthesizing Adaptive Attacks
We use a two-phase attack synthesis approach as shown in Fig. 3 and Algo-
rithm 1. We consider a function F that takes as input a secret h ∈ H and an
attacker-controlled input l ∈ L and that generates side-channel observations
o ∈ O.
Static Analysis Phase. In the first phase we generate observation constraints from
F as shown in Algorithm 2. First, we perform symbolic execution on F with the
secret (h) and the attacker controlled input (l) marked as symbolic [15,26]. Sym-
bolic execution runs F on symbolic rather than concrete inputs resulting in a
set of path constraints Φ. Each φ ∈ Φ is a logical formula that characterizes
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the set of inputs that execute some path in F . During symbolic execution, we
keep track of a side-channel observation for each path. For timing side-channels,
as in other works in this area, we model the execution time of the function
by the number of instructions executed [5, 23, 25]. We assume that the observ-
able values are noiseless, i.e., multiple executions of the program with the same
input value will result in the same observable value. We augmented symbolic
execution to return a function that maps a path constraint φ to an observation
o. Since an attacker cannot extract information from program paths that have
indistinguishable side-channel observations, we combine observationally similar
path constraints via disjunction (Algorithm 2, line 4), where we say that o and
o′ are in the same equivalence class (o ∼ o′) if and only if |o − o′| < δ. The re-
sulting observation constraints (denoted ψo and Ψ) characterize the relationship
between the secret (h) the attacker input (l) and indistinguishable side-channel
observations (o).
Fig. 3: Overview of Attack Synthesis Approach
Algorithm 1 SynthesizeAttack(F (h, l), Ch, h
∗)
This algorithm calls the GenerateConstraints and RunAttack functions
to synthesize adaptive attacks.
1: Ψ ← GenerateConstraints(F (h, l))
2: RunAttack(F (h, l), Ψ, Ch, h
∗)
Attack Synthesis Phase. The second phase synthesizes a sequence of inputs that
allow an attacker to adaptively learn the secret (Algorithm 3). During this phase,
we fix a secret h∗, unknown to the attacker. We maintain a constraint Ch on the
possible values of the secret h. Initially, Ch merely specifies the domain of the
secret. We call algorithm AttackInput-SA, which uses the simulated annealing
technique to maximize information gain about the secret expressed as entropy
(as discussed in §5), to determine the input value l∗ for the current attack step.
Then, the observation o that corresponds to running the program under attack
with h∗ and l∗ is revealed by running the function using the public input l∗. We
update Ch to reflect the new constraint on h implied by the attack input and
observation—we instantiate the corresponding observation constraint, ψo[l 7→
l∗], and conjoin it with the current Ch (line 5). Based on Ch, we compute an
uncertainty measure for h at every step using Shannon entropy [10,29], denoted
H (Section 4.1). The goal is to generate inputs which drive H as close as possible
to zero, in which case there is no uncertainty left about the secret and the secret
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is fully known. This attack synthesis phase is repeated until it is not possible to
reduce the uncertainty, H, any further.
Algorithm 2 GenerateConstraints(F (h, l))
Performs symbolic execution on function F with secret string h and attacker-
controlled string l. The resulting path constraints are combined according to
indistinguishability of observations.
1: Ψ ← ∅
2: (Φ,O, obs)← SymbolicExecution(F (h, l))
3: for o ∈ O do
4: ψo ← ∨φ∈Φ:obs(φ)∼o φ
5: Ψ ← Ψ ∪ {ψo}
6: return Ψ
Algorithm 3 RunAttack(F (h, l), Ψ, Ch, h
∗)
Synthesizes a sequence of attack inputs, l∗, for F (h, l), given observation con-
straints Ψ , initial constraints on h (Ch), and unknown secret h
∗.
1: H ← Entropy(Ch)
2: while H > 0 do
3: l∗ ← AttackInput-SA(Ch, Ψ)
4: o← F (h∗, l∗)
5: Ch ← Ch ∧ ψo[l 7→ l∗]
6: H ← Entropy(Ch)
4 Incremental Attack Synthesis
In this section, we first describe the objective function we use to guide the syn-
thesis of each attack step. Then, we discuss the use of automata-based model
counting for computing the objective function. Finally, we describe our incre-
mental approach to attack synthesis that reuses results of model counting queries
from prior steps for improving efficiency.
4.1 Objective Function for Information Gain
Here we derive an objective function to measure the amount of information
an attacker expects to gain by choosing an input value lval to be used in the
attack search heuristics discussed in §5. In the following discussion, H, L, and O
are random variables representing high-security input, low-security input, and
side-channel observation, respectively. We use entropy-based metrics from the
theory of quantitative information flow [30]. Given probability function p(h),
the information entropy of H, denoted H(H), which we interpret as the initial
uncertainty about the secret, is
H(H) = −
∑
h∈H
p(h) log2 p(h) (1)
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Given conditional distributions p(h|o, l), and p(o|l), we quantify the attacker’s
expected updated uncertainty about h, given a candidate choice of L = lval , with
the expectation taken over all possible observations, o ∈ O. We compute the
conditional entropy of H given O with L = lval as
H(H|O,L = lval) = −
∑
o∈O
p(o|lval)
∑
h∈H
p(h|o, lval) log2 p(h|o, lval) (2)
Now we can compute the expected amount of information gained about h by
observing o after running the function F with a specific input lval . The mutual
information between H and O, given L = lval denoted I(H;O|L = lval) is the
difference between the initial entropy of H and the conditional entropy of H
given O when L = lval :
I(H;O|L = lval) = H(H)−H(H|O,L = lval) (3)
Equation (3) serves as our objective function. Providing input lval = l
∗
which maximizes I(H;O|L = lval) maximizes information gained about h. Equa-
tions (1) and (2) rely on p(h), p(o|l), and p(h|o, l), which may change at ev-
ery step of the attack. Recall that during the attack, we maintain a constraint
on the secret, Ch. Assuming that all secrets that are consistent with Ch are
equally likely, at each step, we can compute the required probabilities using
model counting. Given a formula f , performing model counting on f gives the
number of satisfying solutions for F , which we denote #f . Thus, we observe that
p(h) = 1/#Ch if h satisfies Ch and is 0 otherwise. Hence, Equation 1 reduces to
H(H) = log2(#Ch).
Algorithm 2 gives us side-channel observations O = {o1, . . . , on} and con-
straints over h and l corresponding to each oi, Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψn}. The prob-
ability that the secret has a particular value, constrained by a particular ψi,
for a given lval can be computed by instantiating ψi with lval and then model
counting. Thus, p(h|oi, lval) = 1/#(Ch ∧ ψi)[l 7→ lval ]. Similarly, p(oi|lval) =
#(Ch ∧ ψi)[l 7→ lval ]/#Ch[l 7→ lval ].
In this paper, the Entropy (Equation (1)) and MutualInfo (Equation (3))
functions refer to the appropriate entropy-based computation just described,
where p(h), p(o|l), and p(h|o, l) are computed using the ModelCount algorithm
described in the next section. Using MutualInfo, an attacker can optimize the
information gain by trying many different lval values and computing the corre-
sponding MutualInfo. Observe that this process involves model counting for
instantiating constraints for many values of lval. In the next section we describe
how to perform this model counting step efficiently.
4.2 Automata-Based Constraint Solving and Model Counting
As mentioned above, we compute entropy, which is used in the objective func-
tion for information gain, using model counting. For this purpose, we use and
extend the Automata-Based Model Counter (ABC) tool, which is a constraint
solver for string and numeric constraints with model counting capabilities [3].
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The constraint language for ABC supports all numeric constraints solved by off
the shelf constraints solvers as well as typical string operations such as charAt,
length, indexOf, substring, begins, concat, <, =, etc. Given a constraint C, ABC
constructs a multi-track deterministic finite automaton (DFA) AC that charac-
terizes all solutions for the constraint C, where L(AC) corresponds to the set of
solutions for C. For each string term γ or integer term β in the constraint gram-
mar [4], ABC implements an automata constructor function which generates an
automaton A that encodes the set of satisfying solutions for the term. Note that
variables within string terms and integer terms appear in separate automata,
as separate encodings are used for each (ASCII for strings, binary encoding for
integers). ABC implements specialized DFA construction algorithms for atomic
string operations. Boolean operations (∧, ∨, ¬) are handled using standard DFA
operations (intersection, union, and complement, respectively).
ABC counts the number of models (solutions) for a constraint C by first
constructing the corresponding automaton AC and using the observation that
number of strings of length k in L(AC) is equal to the number of accepting
paths of length k in the DFA AC . Consequently, ABC treats the DFA AC that
results from solving C as a graph where DFA states are graph vertices and the
weight of an edge is the number of symbols that have a transition between the
source and destination vertices (states) of that edge. A dynamic programming
algorithm that computes the kth power of the adjacency matrix of the graph
is used to count the number of accepting paths in the DFA of length k (or less
than or equal to k) [3].
4.3 Incremental Constraint Solving and Model Counting
Attack synthesis requires solving and model counting the constraint on the se-
cret, Ch, and updating it with the current instantiated observation constraint,
ψo[l 7→ lval] (Algorithm 3, line 5). This results in a new constraint, Ch ∧ ψo[l 7→
lval], which we then compute the entropy for (Algorithm 3, line 6). As this pro-
cess is executed many times, multiple calls to ABC are required, often with
similar constraints. In each iteration ABC starts from scratch re-solving each
sub-constraint again and constructing a DFA for each of them, then combining
them using DFA intersection. Note that, during attack synthesis, Ch can become
a complex combination of constraints that represent what we learned over the
course of the attack. Then ABC would be unnecessarily re-solving the subcon-
straints of Ch in each attack step. To summarize, we observe that, during attack
synthesis 1) the constraint that characterizes the set of secrets that are con-
sistent with the observations and low inputs (Ch) is constructed incrementally,
and 2) computing entropy using incremental constraint solving can improve the
performance by exploiting the incremental nature of attack synthesis.
We implemented incremental constraint solving and model counting by ex-
tending ABC so that it retains state over successive calls. Given a constraint,
ABC constructs the automaton representing the set of solutions to the con-
straint, which is then stored for use in later calls. The steps of attack synthesis
involve two types of model counting for Ch and ψo[l 7→ lval]: during Mutual-
Info when an attacker optimizes the attack by trying many different lval , and
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in Entropy, during computation of the remaining uncertainty. In both situ-
ations, model counting is required on many different constraints, and most of
the sub-constraints come from previous iterations. We augmented ABC with an
interface so that, given Ch ∧ ψo[l 7→ lval ], we can check if an automaton has
already been constructed for either Ch or ψo[l 7→ lval], and if so, to get the
already constructed automata for them, rather than re-solving each constraint.
Note that for the purposes of model counting, ψo[l 7→ lval ] can be represented
as ψo ∧ l = lval . Our incremental model counting approach is outlined in Algo-
rithm 4. Given the constraint Ch∧ψo∧l = lval , GetDFA retrieves the previously
constructed automaton for Ch, ACh . Algorithm 4 is called with a new observa-
tion constraint ψo in each attack step, for which the automaton must first be
constructed. Subsequent calls with the same ψo use the previously constructed
automaton. A new Al=lval must be constructed for each model counting query
(as each query involves a different lval). The final automaton A is constructed
using automata product from ACh , Aψo , Al=lval . A is exactly the same automa-
ton constructed from Ch ∧ψo ∧ l = lval , but it is constructed incrementally, thus
allowing re-use of previously constructed automata.
Algorithm 4 ModelCountIncremental(Ch ∧ ψo ∧ l = lval)
Performs incremental model counting for constraint Ch ∧ ψo ∧ l = lval .
1: ACh ← GetDFA(Ch)
2: if IsConstructed(ψo) then
3: Aψo ← GetDFA(ψo)
4: else
5: Aψo ← Construct(ψo)
6: Al=lval ← Construct(l = lval)
7: A← ACh ∩Aψo ∩Al=lval
8: return ModelCount(A)
5 Attack Synthesis Heuristics
At every attack step the attacker’s goal is to choose a low input l∗ that reveals in-
formation about h∗. Here we will describe techniques based on constraint solving
and meta heuristics for synthesizing attack inputs l∗. Meta heuristic approaches
explore a subset of the possible low inputs. In order to search the space effi-
ciently, we first observe that we need to restrict the search to those l that are
consistent with Ch, which we now discuss.
Constraint-based Model Generation of Low Inputs. The first l value can be chosen
arbitrarily since initially we do not have any information about the secret h.
After the first step, our attack synthesis algorithm maintains a constraint Ch
which captures all h values that are consistent with the observations so far
(Algorithm 3, line 5). Using the observation constraints Ψ (which identify the
relation among the secret h, public input l and the observation o), we project Ch
to a constraint on the input l, which we call Cl, and we restrict our search on l to
the set of values allowed by Cl. I.e., we only look for l values that are consistent
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with what we know about h (which is characterized by Ch) with respect to Ψ .
This approach is implemented in GetNeighborInput function which returns
an lval by mutating the previous lval .
Algorithm 5 AttackInput-SA(Ch, Ψ)
Generates a low input at each attack step via simulated annealing.
1: t← t0, lval ← GetInput(Ψ,Ch), I ← MutualInfo(Ψ,Ch, lval)
2: while t ≥ tmin do
3: lval ← GetNeighborInput(lval , Ψ, Ch)
4: Inew ← MutualInfo(Ψ,Ch, lval)
5: if (Inew > I) ∨
(
e(Inew−I)/t > RandomReal(0, 1)
)
then
6: I ← Inew , l∗ ← lval
7: t← t− (t× k)
8: return l∗
Searching via Random Model Generation. As a base-line search heuristic, we
make use of the approach described above for generating low values that are
consistent with Ch. The simplest approach is to generate a single random model
from Cl and use it as the next attack input. We call this approach Model-based
(M). A slightly more sophisticated approach is to generate random samples using
Cl, compute the expected information gain for each of them using Equation (3)
(i.e., objective function is evaluated using the automata-based entropy compu-
tation) and then choose the best one. [28] evaluates different meta heuristic
techniques : genetic algorithm (GA) and simulated annealing (SA) to maximize
information leakage and shows that SA performs better than GA. The reason is
GA applies mutation and crossover to generate candidate low values. To restrict
the search to l values that are consistent with Cl, would require implementing
mutation and crossover operations with respect to Cl. We are not aware of a gen-
eral approach for doing this, so during GA-based search, mutation and crossover
operations can generate low values that are inconsistent with Cl (and hence Ch).
Note that, such values will have no information gain and will be ignored during
search, but they can slow down the search increasing the search space and hence,
we may end up having a higher number of attack steps compared to SA. So, the
SA ends up being a more effective meta-heuristic for attack synthesis.
Simulated Annealing. Simulated annealing (SA) is a meta-heuristic for optimiz-
ing an objective function g(s) [16]. SA is initialized with a candidate solution s0.
At step i, SA chooses a neighbor, si, of candidate si−1. If si is an improvement,
i.e., g(si) > g(si−1), then si is used as the candidate for the next iteration. If
si is not an improvement, i.e. g(si) ≤ g(si−1), then si is still used as the candi-
date for the next iteration, but with a small probability p. Intuitively, SA is a
controlled random search that allows a search path to escape from local optima
by permitting the search to sometimes accept worse solutions. The acceptance
probability p decreases exponentially over time, which is modeled using a search
“temperature” which “cools off” and converges to a steady state. Our use of SA
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that incorporates automata-based entropy computation is given in Algorithm 5
where we use GetNeighborInput function to get new candidates.
6 Implementations and Experiments
Implementation. The implementation of our approach consists of two primary
components, corresponding to the two main phases described in §3. We imple-
mented Algorithm 2 using Symbolic Path Finder (SPF) [26]. We implemented
Algorithm 3 as a Java program that takes the observation constraints generated
by Algorithm 2 as input, along with Ch, h
∗. AttackInput-SA from §5 is imple-
mented directly in Java as well. We implemented GetNeighborInput, Mod-
elCount, and ModelCountIncremental by extending the existing string
model counting tool ABC as described in §4. We added these features directly
into the C++ source code of ABC along with corresponding Java APIs.
Table 7: Benchmark details with the number of path constraints (|Φ|) and the
number of merged observation constraints (|Ψ |).
Benchmark ID Operations
Low
Length
High
Length
|Φ| |Ψ |
passCheckInsec PCI charAt,length 4 4 5 5
passCheckSec PCS charAt,length 4 4 16 1
stringEquals SE charAt,length 4 4 9 9
stringInequality SI <,≥ 4 4 2 2
stringConcatInequality SCOI concat,<,≥ 4 4 2 2
stringCharInequality SCI charAt,length,<,≥ 4 4 80 2
indexOf IO charAt,length 1 8 9 9
compress CO begins,substring,length 4 4 5 5
editDistance ED charAt,length 4 4 2170 22
Benchmark Details. To evaluate the effectiveness of our attack synthesis tech-
niques, we experimented on a benchmark of 9 Java canonical programs utilizing
various logical and string manipulation operations, setting different sizes and
lengths to define the domain of secret value (Table 7). The functions PCI and
PCS are password checking implementations. Both compare a user input and se-
cret password but early termination optimization (as described in §1) induces a
timing side channel for the first one and the latter is a constant-time implemen-
tation. We analyzed the SE method from the Java String library which is known
to contain a timing side channel [11]. We discovered a similar timing side channel
in the IO method from the Java String library. Function ED is an implementa-
tion of the standard dynamic programming algorithm to calculate minimum edit
distance of two strings. Function CO is a basic compression algorithm which col-
lapses repeated substrings within two strings. SI, SCOI and SCI functions check
lexicographic inequality (<,≥) of two strings whereas first one directly compares
the strings, second one includes concat operation with inequality and third one
compares characters in the strings.
Experimental Setup. For all experiments, we use a desktop machine with an
Intel Core i5-2400S 2.50 GHz CPU and 32 GB of DDR3 RAM running Ubuntu
16.04, with a Linux 4.4.0-81 64-bit kernel. We used the OpenJDK 64-bit Java
VM, build 1.8.0 171. We ran each experiment for 5 randomly chosen secrets. We
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present the mean values of the results in Table 8. For SA, we set the temperature
range (t to tmin) from 10 to 0.001 and cooling rate k as 0.1.
Results. In this discussion, we describe the quality of a synthesized attack
according to these metrics: attack synthesis time, attack length, and overall
change in uncertainty about the secret measured as entropy from Hinit to Hfinal
and efficiency of incremental attack synthesis in terms of time. Attacks that do
not reduce the final entropy to zero are called incomplete. Incomplete attacks
are mainly due to one of two reasons: the program is not vulnerable to side-
channels (for example PCS) or the observation constraints are very complex,
combining lots of path constraints which slows progress too much so that not
enough information is leaked within the given time bound (for example ED and
SCI). For the purpose of direct comparison, in our experiments, we set a bound
of 5 hours for SA (slowest technique) on ED and SCI and computed a bound for
Hfinal of 17.28 and 14.48, respectively, while all other examples reduced Hfinal
to 0.0.These examples are marked with ∗. Note that, M and SA-I techniques can
reduce Hfinal for ED and SCI to 14.34 and 12.28, respectively, after one hour.
Attack Synthesis Time Comparison. We observe that the model-based tech-
nique (M), which only uses Cl to restrict the search space is faster than other
techniques, as it greedily uses a random model generated by ABC as the next
attack input, with no time required to evaluate the objective function. M quickly
generates attacks for most of the functions. We examined those functions and de-
termined that their objective functions are “flat” with respect to l. Any lval that
is a model for Cl at the current step yields the same expected information gain.
Figure 4 shows how M can synthesize attacks faster compared to SA (in seconds).
Fig. 4: Synthesis Time, M vs SA Fig. 5: Attack Length, M vs SA/SA-I
Attack Length Comparison. Although M is fast in synthesizing attacks and
generates attacks for each benchmark, experimental results show that it requires
more attack steps (in terms of information gain) compared to the attacks gen-
erated by meta-heuristic techniques that optimize the objective function. As
the experimental results show for the SI, SCOI and SCI, a meta-heuristic tech-
nique can reduce Hfinal further but with fewer attack steps compared to the
model-based approach (M). And, this case would be true for any example where
different inputs at a specific attack step have different information gain. If at-
tacker is aware of the “flat” objective function phenomenon, they can proceed
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with M. In general, M is not efficient to generate an attack with reduced number
of attack steps and hence, meta heuristics like SA approach are required. Fig-
ure 5 shows how SA is better than M in terms of length of the generated attacks.
Note that, we say M vs SA/SA-I as incremental version will make difference in
attack synthesis time, not attack length.
Efficiency of Incremental Attack Synthesis. On one hand, we can synthesize
attacks faster using M but attacks synthesized by M require more attack steps
in general. On the other hand, we can synthesize attacks with minimal number
of attack steps using SA, but attack synthesis process is slower for SA. Our ex-
periments demonstrate that incremental attack synthesis using SA gives us fast
attack synthesis without increasing the attack length. We compare incremental
version of SA (SA-I) against SA. Figure 6 shows SA-I is an order of magnitude
faster than SA for all the examples from the benchmark. We also compare SA-I
against M and Figure 7 shows that SA-I is comparable to M in terms of attack
synthesis time (in seconds).
Fig. 6: Synthesis Time, SA vs SA-I Fig. 7: Synthesis Time, M vs SA-I
Table 8: Experimental results for secure password checker (PCS). Time bound is
set as 3600 seconds.
ID Hinit Metrics M SA SA-I
PCS 18.8
Steps 108 14 99
Hfinal 18.8 18.8 18.8
Vulnerability to Side-Channels. Finally, we observe that some of our selected
benchmarks are more secure against our attack synthesizer than others. In par-
ticular, PCS, a constant-time implementation of password checking, did not leak
any information through the side channel. One of the examples from the bench-
mark, ED also did not succumb to our approach easily, due to the relatively large
number of generated constraints (2170), indicating a much more complex rela-
tionship between the inputs and observations. To summarize, our experiments
indicate that our attack synthesis approach is able to construct side-channel at-
tacks, providing evidence of vulnerability (e.g. PCI). Further, when attack syn-
thesizer fails to generate attacks (PCS), or is only able to extract a relatively small
information after many steps of significant computation time (ED), it provides
evidence that the function under test is comparatively safer against side-channel
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attacks. Table 8 shows results for PCS, hardly reducing Hfinal even after running
for 1 hour for M, SA and SA-I.
7 Case Studies
Our experimental results show that synthesizing attacks face scalability issues
for programs leading to large numbers of complex observation constraints. Note
that, this limitation depends on the limitations of the building blocks: constraint
solvers and model counters. The more powerful these tools become, more pow-
erful attack synthesis will be. We now present two case studies.
CRIME Attack. The Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy (CRIME) at-
tack [27] allows an attacker to learn fields of encrypted web session headers
by injecting extraneous text (l) into a procedure that compresses and encrypts
the header (h). Despite the encryption, an attacker can infer how much of the
injected text matched the unknown header by observing the number of bytes in
the compressed result [5,27]. Our approach automatically synthesizes this attack.
Symbolic execution of the compression function (LZ77T) for a secret of length
3 and alphabet size 4 yields 187 path constraints and 4 observations, leading
to 4 observation constraints. M synthesizes an attack in 6.8 steps within 468.5
seconds. SA-I could generate the attack in 7.8 steps within 757.4 seconds. SA-I
does not improve over M due to “flat” objective function. Note that [5] performs
leakage quantification for this example but does not synthesize attacks.
Law Enforcement Database. The Law Enforcement Employment Database Server
is a network service application included as a part of the DARPA STAC pro-
gram [1, 2]. This application provides access to records about law enforcement
personnel. Employee information is determined by an employee ID number. The
database contains restricted and unrestricted employee information. Users can
search ranges of employee IDs. If an ID query range contains one or more re-
stricted IDs, the returned data will not contain the restricted IDs. We decompiled
the application and then symbolically executed the channelRead0 method from
the UDPServerHandler class which performs the database search operation. We
limited the domain of ids to 1024, added 30 unrestricted IDs and 1 restricted
ID. Symbolic execution gives us 1669 path constraints with 162 distinguishable
observations (δ = 10 instructions). M generates attack with an attack length of
8.2 in 270.1 seconds whereas SA-I generates an attack with length of 6.5 in 810.7
seconds. SA-I requires less attack length as the objective function is not “flat”.
8 Related Work
There are two previous results that are most closely related to our work [5, 23].
The first focuses on quantifying information leakage through side channels for
programs manipulating strings [5]. This work assumes that the given program
has a segment oracle side-channel vulnerability and then quantifies the amount
of information leakage for that vulnerability. Other recent work synthesizes side-
channel attacks using either entropy-based or SAT-based objective functions,
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but works only for linear arithmetic and bit-vector constraints [23], using model
counters and constraint solvers for those theories [19]. This earlier approach also
relies on generation of a closed form objective function that represents the in-
formation leakage, and uses model counting techniques that specialize on linear
integer arithmetic to construct such a function. In contrast, our approach is more
general and can handle any program with numeric, string and mixed constraints.
Furthermore, our approach does not require a closed form solution for the ob-
jective function as we use meta heuristics to search for input values that leak
maximum information. Both of these earlier approaches use constraint solving
and model counting queries to quantify the information leakage, but they do not
use an incremental approach and, therefore, re-compute many sub-queries.
There are many works on analyzing side-channels in various settings [5, 7, 8,
12,21,25]. A few recent works address either synthesizing attacks or quantifying
information leakage under a model where the attacker can make multiple invoca-
tions of the system [5,6,17,21,25]. Single-run analysis is addressed in [13] where
bounded model checking is used over the k-composition of a program to deter-
mine if it can yield k different outputs. Further, LeakWatch [9] estimates leak-
age in Java programs based on sampling program executions on concrete inputs.
There has been work on multi-run analysis using enumerative techniques [17].
None of these earlier results present a symbolic and incremental approach to
adaptive attack synthesis as we present in this paper.
Due to the importance of model counting in quantitative program analyses,
model counting constraint solvers are gaining increasing attention [3, 20, 31].
ABC is the only one that supports string, numeric and mixed constraints. We
extended ABC to perform incremental model counting for our attack synthesis
approach. Other work in quantifying information leakage [6, 23–25] have used
symbolic execution and model-counting techniques for linear integer arithmetic.
Preliminary results from this paper were discussed in a short workshop pa-
per [28] which did not include our results on incremental attack synthesis and
real world scenarios but was focused on studying different meta-heuristic tech-
niques such as random search, genetic algorithm, and simulated annealing.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented techniques for synthesizing adaptive side-channel at-
tacks on programs that manipulate string and numeric values. Our approach uses
meta-heuristics for selecting public inputs that maximize the amount of informa-
tion gained about the secret by computing the amount of remaining uncertainty
about the secret using entropy and model counting. We exploit the iterative
nature of attack synthesis by presenting an incremental approach that reuses
results from prior iterations. We implemented our attack synthesis approach
for Java programs using symbolic execution tool SPF and ABC model counter.
We evaluated the effectiveness of our attack synthesis approach on several func-
tions and two case studies. Our experiments demonstrate that our incremental
approach greatly improves the efficiency of attack synthesis.
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